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INTRODUCTION
The paradigmatic defendant in a patent lawsuit is a vertically integrated
manufacturer. But much economic activity is conducted collaboratively by a supply chain
of vertically disintegrated firms, 1 in which multiple firms are sometimes implicated in
infringing activities, by making, selling, or using patented technology, or by contributing
to or inducing another firm’s infringement. Often patent owners have the option of suing
some or all of the members of a supply chain who contribute to the design, creation, and
marketing of a new technology.
To illustrate, a firm named NorthPeak launched a patent enforcement campaign
against supply chains active in the market for office building security technology. In 2008,
the patent owner “alleged infringement by computers, routers and adapters made by 3Com
Corp., Dell Inc. and 25 other manufacturers. Intel intervened in 2009 on behalf of the nine
defendants that used its chips.” 2 Intel challenged the validity of claims in two patents
asserted by NorthPeak in reexamination proceedings at the USPTO. The agency
invalidated the relevant claims in one patent but not the other. 3 Following a five year stay
of the district court proceedings, 4 litigation resumed and the trial judge used NorthPeak
testimony in the reexaminations to construe the remaining claims narrowly, which lead

1

Supply chain industries are highly innovative and account for a large share of the U.S. economy. See
Mercedes Delgado & Karen G. Mills, A New Categorization of the U.S. Economy: The Role of Supply
Chain Industries in Performance, 02/06/2017 at 4 (“We find that supply chain industries compose a large
and important segment of the economy. They accounted for 37% of U.S. private employment and 43% of
all employer firms in 2012.”)
2
Tony Dutra, Reexamination: Intel Successfully Defends Chip Users in Patent Case, BNA’S PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L.J. – DAILY EDITION, Dec. 29, 2016, available at
http://iplaw.bna.com.ezproxy.bu.edu/iprc/5007/split_display.adp?fedfid=102653162&vname=ptdbulallissu
es&jd=a0k6n6n0b4&split=0.
3
See NorthPeak Wireless, LLC v. 3Com Corp., No. 2016-1477, 2016 WL 7448769, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 28,
2016).
4
See Dutra, supra note 2.
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NorthPeak to stipulate non-infringement. 5 NorthPeak appealed to the Federal Circuit,
which affirmed the claim construction, presumably ending the lawsuit in late 2016. 6
Because of patent assertions like this, businesses increasingly contemplate the risk
of patent infringement when they negotiate contractual relations to form a supply chain.
Upstream and downstream firms recognize they may be jointly liable for patent
infringement because of their relationship to each other and their connection to the new
product. An interesting and difficult question is: how should they manage infringement
risk to maximize their joint profit? Which firm should control litigation? Or should they
plan for joint control? Should they share responsibility for damages and litigation
expenses? If yes, what determines each party’s share?
The traditional and simple answer to these questions is that the upstream firm
should bear the risk of infringement because it is best able to avoid infringement. 7 Imposing
the risk of infringement on the vendor appropriately penalizes a vendor guilty of piracy.
More importantly, imposing the risk on the vendor induces non-piratical vendors to make
careful design and manufacturing choices, and obtain patent licenses when the risk of
infringement is substantial. 8

5

See NorthPeak Wireless, 2016 WL 7448769, at *1.
Id.
7
For example, an Intel policy statement provides: “IP Indemnity policy. When Intel sells products, it provides
indemnity against third party intellectual property claims. Conversely, when Intel is the customer, it requires
supplier infringement indemnification against intellectual property rights claimed by third parties.” Supplier
Guide, INTEL, https://supplier.intel.com/static/russia/english/supplier_01.htm. For commentary suggesting
this is generally true, see Robert Rudnick, Intellectual Property Defense and Indemnification Provisions,
IPFRONTLINE, July 13, 2010, http://blog.ip.com/2010/07/intellectual-property-defense-and-indemnificationprovisions/ (“boilerplate IP defense and indemnification provisions are typically overly broad in favor of
protecting the buyer or licensee”).
8
See generally Melvin Simensky & Eric C. Osterberg, The Insurance and Management of Intellectual
Property Risks, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321, 322-24 (1999) (describing steps a firm can take to
implement an IP compliance program); JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 4-17,
at 35 (2007).
6
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This approach parallels the infringement risk allocation chosen when copyright or
trade secret lawsuits create concern within a supply chain. Typically, a movie producer
assumes the risk of a copyright infringement claim against a movie distributor or exhibitor.9
Similarly, a software vendor assumes the risks that one of its coders copied code and
violated another party’s copyright or trade secret rights. 10
The traditional approach to patent defense risk allocation has been complicated by
deterioration of the notice function of the patent system. 11 In certain settings no firm in the
supply chain is well positioned to clear patent rights in advance. 12 Instead of risk
management, the key consideration becomes which firm in the supply chain is likely to be
the most effective bargainer in settlement negotiations following the assertion of patent
rights against a member of the supply chain. Bargaining power may vary across the supply

9

See KELLY CRABB, THE MOVIE BUSINESS: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO THE LEGAL AND FINANCIAL SECRETS
GETTING YOUR MOVIE MADE 392-93 (2005); Oren Bitan, Five Tips for Film Distributors and Other
Apr.
2014,
at
32,
available
at
Licensees,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MAGAZINE,
www.intellectualpropertymagazine.com (“A film distributor must also ensure that its distribution agreement
includes an indemnification provision protecting it from liability arising from copyright infringement suits
relating to its distribution.”).
10
When a licensor can monitor and avoid copying, licensors typically offer a warranty against infringement
and misappropriation of third party copyrights and trade secrets. See Dratler, supra note 8, at 10 (“Indeed,
full warranties are common in copyright licenses, where they often cover, or are accompanied by, warranties
against defamation. The same reasoning also justifies full warranties in licenses of mask works and trade
secrets as well.”).
11
The patent system provides good notice when a technology user or developer can determine what patent
rights exist that might be asserted against it, and also the scope and ownership of those rights. These
conditions make patent clearance more likely and inadvertent patent infringement less likely. Deterioration
of patent notice is discussed in JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS AND LAWYER PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46-72 (2008).
12
See Robert E. Rudnick & Andrew M. Grodin, United States: Drafting and Negotiating Intellectual
Property Defense and Indemnification Provisions – What You Don’t Know Could Cost Your Client Millions,
INTELL, PROP. LITIG. (June 15, 2010), http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?article_id=102916&signup=true
(“While liability for copyright infringement and trade secret misappropriation actions are often successfully
avoided or managed by corporate policies prohibiting intentional malicious acts, patent infringement actions
often arise without the intentional act of copying or the like by the Seller and therefore require greater
attention in the drafting of IP defense and indemnification provisions.”). See also Dratler, supra note 8, at 45.
OF
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chain to the extent that some firm in the supply chain has more litigation and bargaining
experience, better information relevant to the lawsuit, or stronger incentives to litigate.
In this Article, I explore the factors that determine the efficient allocation of patent
damages liability within the supply chain. In particular, I explain why deterioration of
patent notice and the related rise of inadvertent patent infringement and patent assertions
by non-practicing entities 13 may push firms to focus more on ex post patent litigation and
settlement bargaining rather than ex ante licensing and avoidance of infringement suits
when they allocate patent infringement risk across the supply chain. 14
If bargaining effectiveness concerns drive the allocation of patent defense risk, this
suggests there is an interesting parallel to concerns held by patent owners who transfer
patent rights to patent assertion entities (PAEs). Many commentators have noted that patent
rights are often traded so that patents are controlled and asserted by the party in the
strongest bargaining position as a patent plaintiff. 15 Indemnification and insurance
agreements allow parties to shift control of settlement and defense in patent litigation to
achieve the same kind of result – the party in the strongest bargaining position acts as the
patent infringement defendant. 16

13

See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387
(2014) (contending that patent notice failure created an environment that allowed patent trolls to flourish).
14
See Rudnick, supra note 7 (“[R]ecently we have seen Buyers more aggressively seeking contract language
creating Seller’s IP defense and indemnity obligation upon an allegation of infringement, particularly in
market segments with patent troll activity.”).
15
See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC STUDY (Oct. 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftcavailable
at
study/p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf; Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids,
Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-tech Patent, 87 N.C. L. REV., 1571
(2009); Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12.
16
This Article analyzes the structure of indemnification agreements that maximize profit within the supply
chain. I will explain how parties allocate damages and litigation control in response to the activity of patent
assertion entities and other factors, but I will not address and I am not aware of any empirical evidence
indicating how significant any particular factor might be in shaping the choice of indemnification agreements
actually agreed to in the market.
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I. PATENT INFRINGEMENT RISK ACROSS THE SUPPLY CHAIN
A. The Wide Net of Liability Cast by Section 271

The term supply chain refers to the network of organizations relied on by a producer
to obtain inputs and distribute outputs within a market. 17 Thus, members of a supply chain
may include a manufacturer, its upstream suppliers of physical inputs, software, and
services, and downstream parties that distribute and sell the manufactured product. Patent
law often gives discretion to a patent owner to sue different members of a supply chain for
patent infringement arising out of a particular set of facts. 18
Section 271 of the Patent Act designates a variety of actions that may constitute
direct or indirect patent infringement. Making, selling, and using a patented invention
without permission constitute infringement under Section 271(a). 19
Section 271(b) and Section 271(c) cover two forms of indirect infringement, the
first covers inducement and the second covers contributory infringement. 20 The other

17

See John T. Mentzer et al., Defining Supply Chain Management, 22 J. BUS. LOGISTICS 1, 4 (2001).
Why does patent law give potential plaintiffs an array of choices about whom to sue for infringement? To
some extent, patent law (and copyright law and trademark law as well) defines the scope of liability by
reference to principles familiar from tort law. Probably the most intuitive justification for expanding the set
of potential defendants is to make sure the plaintiff can be made whole when the “natural” defendant is either
judgment proof or hard to find or sue. Efficient enforcement is a second important benefit to the plaintiff
arising from expanding the set of actors who may be liable. The owner of a patent on a method of applying
an herbicide to rice fields could sue each farmer that infringes the method claim. But it would be more costeffective to sue a “bottleneck defendant,” such as the chemical company that makes and sells the unpatented
chemical used by the infringing farmers. If the chemical is not a staple and the chemical company has
sufficient knowledge, then it can be held liable as a contributory infringer. In addition, to litigation efficiency,
the opportunity to sue an upstream party provides the added benefit to the patent owner of avoiding suit
against its actual and potential customers.
19
See 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West 2010).
20
See 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 271(b), 271(c) (West 2010).
18
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subsections of Section 271 cover other acts that also may expose supply chain members to
liability for patent infringement. 21
It is easy to understand how a patent owner can assert its patent against different
firms in a supply chain. Downstream from the manufacturer, distributors and retailers may
be liable for selling a product, and consumers may be liable for using the product. Upstream
from the manufacturer, a firm may directly infringe by making and selling a patented
component that is used by the manufacturer, or using a patented method to provide a service
to the manufacturer. An upstream firm may also indirectly infringe by aiding or
contributing to infringement by the manufacturer. Finally, the manufacturer potentially
faces the same range of liability theories as an upstream supplier.
To simplify, consider a supply chain that is limited to two parties: a buyer and a
seller. Table One illustrates some of the common fact patterns that expose a buyer and
seller to simultaneous patent infringement liability arising from activities related to their
transaction. The rows in the table display cases in which the product is a component or
device used as part of a patented technology to cases in which the seller offers the final
good or service. The columns compare infringement of product claims to process claims.
Consider the left side of the bottom row. When a firm sells a final product that reads
on a product claim, then that firm may be held liable for making and selling the invention.
If the buyer is a distributor, then it may be held liable for selling; otherwise, a buyer may
be held liable for use.

21

35 U.S.C.A. § 271(e) (West 2010) covers certain activities by firms seeking FDA approval of their
marketing of a patented pharmaceutical. Sections 271(f) and 271(g) cover certain trans-national activities.
See 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 271(f), 271(g) (West 2010).
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TABLE ONE

Product Claim

Component

Seller

Buyer

Seller

Buyer

Contribute,

Make, Sell,

Contribute,

Use

Induce

Use

Induce

Aro, 22 Crystal Semiconductor 23
Final Product

Process Claim

Make, sell

Sell, use

Innovative Wireless 25

Dawson Chemical 24
Use, induce

Use, joint use

Limelight 26

Next consider the right side of the bottom row. When a firm delivers a service to
an end user the nature of liability for infringing a process claim depends on whether the
buyer or seller performs the steps of the service, or whether they jointly perform the steps.
If the seller performs all the steps and the buyer merely enjoys the benefit of the service,
then the buyer is not liable at all, and the seller is liable for use. If the buyer performs the
steps, the seller may be indirectly liable for inducement when, for example, the seller
provides software that performs infringing steps when loaded onto the buyer’s computing

22

Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(TriTech made audio chips in Singapore and sold the chips worldwide. OPTi obtained a supply of chips from
TriTEch and sold them in the U.S. OPTi was directly liable for its sales, but TriTech did not practice Crystal
Semiconductor’s patented method in the U.S., and thus it could not be directly liable for infringement, but
TriTech was held indirectly liable for inducing the infringement by OPTi).
24
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
25
Innovative Wireless Solutions LLC Accuses Hotels (and Others) of Infringing WiFi/Ethernet Patents
PATENT
BLOG
(April
24,
2013),
Formerly
Owned
by
Nortel,
ESSENTIAL
http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2013/04/innovative-wireless-solutions-llc-accuses-hotels-ofinfringing-wifiethernet-patents-formerly-owned-by-nortel/ (an NPE filed suits against many different hotel
chains for use of wireless routers based on patents originally assigned to Nortel).
26
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
23
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platform. 27 There also may be cases in which the seller performs some of the claim’s steps
and the buyer performs the other steps, and the buyer and seller are jointly liable for the
infringing use.
When the seller provides a component or device that may be used by the buyer to
make an infringing product or practice a patented method, then the seller may be indirectly
liable for contributory infringement or inducement. Buyers infringe product claims when
they combine the component with other components to make the claimed invention, or
when they use the device provided by the seller to practice the claimed process.
Given that buyers may expose themselves to claims of patent infringement as users
or re-sellers, or because they are more thoroughly involved in developing infringing
technology, it is natural for buyers to contemplate patent infringement when they negotiate
a contract with a seller. 28 More generally, members of the supply chain often address patent
infringement risk with contract terms that establish obligations of the parties in the event
that the buyer or seller is sued for patent infringement in connection with their joint
activities. This Article focuses on contract language relating to indemnification and the
control of patent litigation. 29 For the sake of brevity I will use the phrase indemnification
clause to cover these issues.

27
Dina Bass, Microsoft Adds Patent Suit Protections for Cloud Customers, BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 9,
2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-08/microsoft-adds-patent-suitprotections-for-cloud-customers (“As more companies host their applications and services on Microsoft’s
Azure and other cloud providers, they are increasingly becoming the target of lawsuits from companies
seeking to make money by claiming patent infringement.”).
28
Dratler, supra note 8, at 16 (“[L]icensees normally request – and licensors often grant – indemnities with
respect to, and/or covenants to defend, actions for infringement or misappropriation brought against
licensees by third parties.”).
29
Sellers also may offer warranties and representations of non-infringement. For example, the seller of a
good may include a warranty of non-infringement in a sales contract. Further, the UCC contains a default
warranty of non-infringement, if the contract is silent regarding patent infringement. See U.C.C. § 2-312. In
this Article, I limit my attention to sophisticated parties that waive the UCC warranty and actively negotiate
an indemnification clause. See Chad A. Rutkowski, Patent Infringement Indemnification: Vendor
Indemnification of Patent Infringement Claims – Maximizing the Indemnitee’s Right to Enforcement,
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B. Who Pays Damages in the Absence of Contractual Allocation?
The outcome of negotiations about an indemnification clause depends on what
would happen to the parties in the absence of an agreement. If buyers were never targeted
with patent lawsuits, even though they might be infringers, then the parties might not exert
much effort to negotiate these clauses. Given patent litigation realities, buyers face positive
expected patent litigation costs from many transactions, and sellers often agree to provide
indemnification. In well-functioning markets, the expected cost of such a clause will be
reflected in the sales price. Higher indemnification costs for a seller mean a higher sales
price to a buyer.
Anecdote and limited empirical evidence suggests that buyers are increasingly
targeted as defendants in patent lawsuits. 30 More generally, patent litigation increasingly
involves activities spread across a value chain, and not limited solely to the actions of a
single vertically integrated manufacturer. 31 Likely, these changes can be attributed in part
to changes in the nature of inventions, changes in strategies pursued by patent plaintiffs,
and changes in the content of patent law. Consider three possible explanations:
•

The growth of complex and modular technology is associated with more
decentralized innovation and more collaboration between parties who might

BLOOMBERG
CORP.
L.J.
282,
282
(2008),
available
at
https://www.bakerlaw.com/files/uploads/Documents/News/Articles/INTELLECTUAL%20PROPERTY/20
15/Rutkowski-WW-Vendor-Indemnification-of-Patent-Infringement-Claims.pdf (“To recover on a breach of
warranty claim, it would first have to be proven that the vendor’s goods or services infringed the patent at
issue. Then, in a subsequent suit between the buyer and vendor, the buyer would have to prove that the
infringement fell within the scope of the warranty . . . . [T]o be free from such claims buyers often supplement
their warranty requirements in a supply contract with indemnification provisions.”).
30
Brian J. Love & James C. Yoon, Expanding Patent Law’s Customer Suit Exception, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1605,
1610-11 (2013).
31
Bass, supra note 27 ("As IT spending in the cloud is set to reach $1 trillion by 2020, according to
Gartner, the industry faces growing risks of intellectual property lawsuits. Such suits have risen 22 percent
in the past five years, according to the Boston Consulting Group. Meanwhile non-practicing entities -- the
industry's term for firms that snap up patents to garner licensing fees and launch lawsuits -- boosted their
acquisition of such patents by 35 percent in the same period.”).
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participate in an infringing activity. 32 In the classic story of patent infringement, an
integrated pharmaceutical firm asserts a drug patent against an integrated
competitor that makes and sells the drug. But research suggests that the number of
complex inventions and related patents has grown relative to discrete inventions
like traditional, small-molecule, pharmaceutical inventions. 33 Often today patent
litigation concerns a technology that is implemented on the internet, by multiple
parties providing different resources or performing different steps of a patented
process. 34
•

The frequency of customer suits has grown in tandem with the growth of patent
litigation by PAEs. Certain PAEs profit from asserting weak claims that appear to
have negative expected value. They may profit from such frivolous litigation by
exploiting asymmetries in the patent litigation process. 35 Apparently, a particularly
profitable strategy guides the opportunists to assert their patents against customers.
Allegedly, patent plaintiffs get higher damages at the end of the value chain than

32

See generally Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, Managing in an Age of Modularity, 75 HARV. BUS.
REV. 84 (1997) (“The entire driver’s cockpit [of a Mercedes-Benz SUV], . . . —including air bags, heating
and air-conditioning systems, the instrument cluster, the steering column, and the wiring harness—is a
separate module produced at a . . . plant owned by Delphi Automotive Systems, a unit of General Motors
Corporation.”).
33
See generally Elisabetta Ottoz &Franco Cugno, Patent – Secret Mix in Complex Product Firms, 10 AMER.
LAW & ECON. REV. 142 (2008).
34
E.g., BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“four different parties perform
different acts within one claim”—customer, merchant, debit network, customer’s financial institution);
McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7531 (Fed. Cir. April 12, 2011) (defendant
did not perform any steps related to the method of communication between health care providers and patients;
defendant provided platform); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (defendant did not perform last step of the method for efficient delivery of web content; defendant’s
customers performed last step).
35
Patent assertion entities can file a patent lawsuit at a relatively low cost and impose larger costs on
defendants when they reply to the complaints and especially once discovery begins, because discovery
costs are typically much higher for defendants. These asymmetries sustain credible settlement demands by
certain PAEs even when their lawsuits have negative expected value if pushed through to a verdict. Mark
Lemley and Doug Melamed describe these PAEs as “bottom-feeders.” Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas
Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2126 (2013).
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they would get if they sued a manufacturer. 36 Also, customers may have less
information, expertise, and interest in fighting an opportunistic patent assertion in
court. 37
•

The impact of changes in patent law on the number of defendants in patent lawsuits,
and in particular on buyers as defendants is not as clear. The expansion of direct
liability for the joint practice of patented processes after Akamai IV may add to the
incentive to sue customers. Also, more rigorous knowledge requirements to prove
indirect infringement may force patent owners to target customers more often. But
these intuitions are difficult to evaluate empirically.
Regardless of the cause or causes, the evidence points to more defendants per patent

lawsuit, and more targeting of customers. Blair and Cotter found customers were targeted
in only 5 out 1340 patent cases with reported opinions from late January 1995 through late
January 1998. 38 In contrast, Chien and Reines analyzed Patent Freedom/RPX data on the
top ten patent litigation campaigns from 2010-2013 and found that these campaigns
targeted about 2200 customers. 39 (These observations are not directly comparable, but they
line-up with commentary from practitioners stating customer suits are up sharply.)
Remember that I have only an indirect interest in the frequency of customer suits.
My real interest is in finding evidence that indemnification clauses have become more

36

In theory, patent damages should be invariant to the position in the supply chain occupied by a particular
defendant, but practitioners state that jurors bias damages upward when they focus on the sales revenue
from final product sales instead of low revenue transactions up the value chain. See Bernard Chao, The
Case for Contribution in Patent Law, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 97, 115 (2011); Love & Yoon, supra note 30, at
1633–35.
37
Id. at 1628.
38
Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Seller and User Liability in Intellectual
Property Law, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1999)
39
Colleen Chien & Edward Reines, Why Technology Customers Are Being Sued En Masse for Patent
Infringement and What Can Be Done, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 235, 236 (2014).
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important, or more contentious, or more litigated. 40 I am not aware of any data indicating
that indemnification clauses have greater business significance than in the past, or even
data showing that businesses care very much at all about these clauses. 41 I conjecture that
they are increasingly significant because of the growth in patent suits targeting buyers,
especially end-users. To illustrate, consider the patent assertion campaign by Innovative
Wireless Solutions (IWS) which aroused the ire of several router manufacturers who
agreed to indemnify their customers. 42 IWS sued dozens of hotels and coffee shops for
patent infringement because they offered Wi-Fi access to their customers. 43 Ruckus

40

I find few reported opinions addressing disputes about patent litigation indemnification clauses. This could
mean that these clauses are simply not very important. I think, instead, there are few reported opinions
because these disputes are normally arbitrated. See Dratler, supra note 8, at 22 (“Although enforcement of
indemnities is common, it does not necessarily require litigation. An arbitration clause in an agreement
covering disputes ‘relating to’ the agreement may be applied to infringement warranties and indemnities, just
as to other contractual provisions.”); Charles Davies, Arbitration Clauses and Third-Party IP Claims, AIPLA
NEWSSTAND (April 4, 2013) http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=93e5de66-8165-4769-ba21c1e3f67329f2 (describing global practice in software licenses of requiring indemnity disputes to go to
arbitration).
41
IP licensing attorneys contend that indemnification clauses are important: “In IP license negotiations,
especially those between a supplier and a customer in a manufacturing chain, the scope of the indemnity
clause will be a subject of much debate. The customer will seek to broaden the indemnity clause to cover all
possible assertions of intellectual property against the licensed technology and related losses, regardless of
whether the licensed technology forms only one component or one portion of an overall product. The supplier
will often push in the opposite direction to limit the indemnity clause to cover only third party claims that are
directed at the licensed component and nothing more. To clarify this limitation, suppliers may ask for an
indemnity clause that explicitly carves out indemnity coverage when the licensed component is combined
with other non-licensed components to create a larger system or device.” Eugene Y. Mar, Erik C. Olson &
Marc Tarlock, Drafting Intellectual Property Agreements: Best Practices From a Litigator’s Perspective,
9,
2015)
(September
http://www.fbm.com/Drafting_Intellectual_Property_Agreements_Best_Practices_From_a_Litigators_Pers
pective_09-25-2015/; Rudnick, supra note 7 (“Sellers are now facing large potential damages including the
Buyer’s lost profits, business interruption expenses and other consequential damages.”).
42
See Bill Donahue, Cisco, HP Sue Patent Holder Over Wi-Fi Litigation Blitz, LAW360, (June 14, 2013)
http://www.law360.com/articles/450300/cisco-hp-sue-patent-holder-over-wi-fi-litigation-blitz; Innovative
Wireless Solutions LLC Accuses Hotels (and Others) of Infringing WiFi/Ethernet Patents Formerly Owned
PATENT
BLOG
(April
24,
2013)
by
Nortel,
ESSENTIAL
http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2013/04/innovative-wireless-solutions-llc-accuses-hotels-ofinfringing-wifiethernet-patents-formerly-owned-by-nortel/ (an NPE filed suits against many different hotel
chains for use of wireless routers based on patents originally assigned to Nortel).
43
Cisco received indemnification demands from some of its customers in this case. See Cisco, Inc. v.
Innovative Wireless Solutions, LLC, (declaratory judgment complaint) Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-00492
http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/64/2013/06/Cisco-Systems-Inc-v-InnovativeWireless-Solutions-LLC-Complaint.pdf. I discuss Cisco’s experience in this case in note 77.
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Wireless brought a declaratory judgment action against Innovative Wireless, and in its
complaint stated that it had “received several demands from one or more of the parties sued
by IWS, based on agreements and/or the UCC and related to IWS’ patent infringement
claims, that IWS, as the manufacturer of wireless access points used by those parties,
defend and indemnify those parties against IWS’ infringement claims.” 44 Similarly, in a
separate declaratory judgment action against IWS, HP stated: “Several of the defendants
in the Original IWS actions use wireless access points manufactured by HP and sought
indemnification from HP.” 45
Absent an indemnification clause, the hotels and coffee shops would have been
liable for the damages caused by their use of the Wi-Fi if they were shown to be liable. In
theory, the magnitude of damages from the use of Wi-Fi by a particular coffee shop is
invariant to whether the coffee shop or the equipment vendor is sued. Furthermore, if the
patent owner successfully sues one defendant, it cannot gain more damages from that
instance of infringement by suing another defendant in the supply chain. This doctrine is
known as the single recovery rule or the “one satisfaction rule.” Judges have applied the
doctrine rigorously. 46 Indemnification agreements are used to allocate this single recovery

44
Ruckus Wireless, Inc. v. Innovative Wireless Solutions, LLC, (declaratory judgment complaint) Civil
Action No.1:13-cv-00504 https://search.rpxcorp.com/litigation_documents/10109858.
45
Complaint at 3, Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Innovative Wireless Solutions, LLC, W.D. Tex. (2013) (No. 1:13cv-491).
46
3-12 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04 (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., 2015); Despite the single
recovery rule, a plaintiff may get larger expected profits from a suit against multiple defendants. This might
be true if there is an opportunity to enforce injunctive relief that has differing effects against different
defendants, and because of bargaining gains to the plaintiff caused by a less effectively managed defense and
higher total litigation costs spread across multiple defendants. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS, § 50 (Am. Law Inst. 1982); TMTV, Corp. v. Mass Prods., 645 F.3d 464, 472 (1st Cir. P.R.
2011); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U.S. 321, 343-46 (U.S. 1971); BUC Int'l Corp. v. Int'l
Yacht Council Ltd., 517 F.3d 1271, 1276-79 (11th Cir. Fla. 2008); McDermott, Inc. v. Amclyde, 511 U.S.
202 (U.S. 1994).
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(that is, the damage award) among potential defendants who have a contractual relationship
prior to the patent assertion.
Indemnification agreements are negotiated in the shadow of the “default” damage
apportionment decisions that would emerge from the choices of the plaintiff about whom
to sue, and the decision of the court about who is liable and the magnitude of damages. A
key consideration is the imposition of joint and several liability on a losing defendant. 47
Apart from enhancement of damages and fee-shifting that results from willfulness, 48 any
losing defendant can be held liable for the full damages arising from joint liability. 49
A defendant that fears it will be compelled to satisfy the entire judgment won by a
successful patent plaintiff might be able to use certain tactics to spread its losses. A buyerdefendant may be able to turn to a seller and seek indemnification under a warranty of noninfringement. 50

47

See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 500 (1964) (“It is true that a
contributory infringer is a species of joint-tortfeasor, who is held liable because he has contributed with
another to the causing of a single harm to the plaintiff.”); see also, Hewlett–Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb
Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, (Fed. Cir. 1990); Conopco, Inc. v. May Dept. Stores Co., 797 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.
MO, 1992) (holding that the rule of joint and several liability applies to a retailer and manufacturer); Randles
Films, LLC v. Quantum Releasing, LLC, 511 Fed. Appx. 370 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the rule of joint
and several liability applies in copyright suit against movie distributor).
48
Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1574, (Fed. Cir. 1996); Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v.
TriTech Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Parties not found to willfully
infringe, therefore, cannot be held jointly and severally liable for willfulness damages.”).
49
The one satisfaction rule reduces the liability of one defendant to the extent that a damages judgment has
been satisfied by another party. Saf-Gard Products, Inc. v. Service Parts, Inc., 491 F.Supp. 996, 1012 (D.
Ariz. 1980). (“Two of the former defendants in this action, Balkamp, Inc. and Genuine Parts Company, sold
infringing devices which were manufactured by Service Parts. On February 13, 1980, this court entered a
stipulated judgment against these two defendants, assessing damages in the amount of $200,000 in
conjunction with their infringing sales. In situations of this type where one defendant has manufactured and
another has sold infringing devices, they both have contributed toward the infringement and are treated as
joint tortfeasors: the release of one does not release the other unless the plaintiff has been fully compensated
for the infringement contributed to by both.”).
50
A seller may offer an explicit warranty, or an implied warranty of non-infringement may be found for sales
subject to the UCC.
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If the defendant cannot claim the benefit of a warranty of non-infringement, 51 then
it may try to implead another potentially liable party and seek contribution. Defendants
have argued for contribution based on state laws and also federal common law. 52 A small
number of district courts have considered and rejected this possibility, but Bernard Chao
argues that contribution is desirable 53 in patent cases and is permitted under his reading of
the law. 54

C. Indemnification and Insurance
In addition to or instead of indemnification, parties in a supply chain might turn to
insurance to address the risk of patent litigation. 55 A party that agrees to indemnify other
parties might shift its risk to a liability insurer. 56 Alternatively, every party in the supply

51

No warranty would be available if the seller disclaims a warranty of non-infringement. See, e.g., Intel
Software License Agreement, Revision 06042013, Intel® True Scale Fabric Switch Firmware (Internal Use
and Object Code Distribution), at 7, http://www.intel.com/content/dam/support/us/en/documents/networkand-i-o/fabric-products/True_Scale_Switch_FW_License_Agreement_H13244_002.pdf (last visited Feb. 6,
2017).
52
Phillip M. Adams & Associates, L.L.C. v. Dell Inc., No. 1:05-CV-64 TS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80139
(D. Utah, October 9, 2008) (Sony was sued for patent infringement and filed a third-party complaint against
a semiconductor manufacturer for indemnification and contribution. Sony and Winbond did not have a
contract. Sony argued that the Patent Act created an implied right to contribution and draws an analogy to a
federal securities law case in which the Supreme Court did find an implied right to contribution. See Musick,
Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286 (U.S. 1993). However, there are other cases in
which the Court has refused to find an implied right of contribution. The court rejected Sony’s argument, and
it also rejected Sony’s attempt to claim contribution under Utah law.).
53
Chao, supra note 36, at 136 (arguing that the presence of component supplier and not merely an endproduct manufacturer at trial corrects biases that lead courts to over-reward patent owners that prove a
component contained in a complex product infringes a claim in the owner’s patent).
54
Id.
55
Melvin Simensky & Eric C. Osterberg, Insurance and Management of Intellectual Property Risks, 17
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321, 327 (1999) (noting insurers may require insured parties to implement a
clearance practice and insist that outside attorneys supervise clearance).
56
RFR Indust., Inc. v. Rex-Hide Indust., Inc., No. 20-05-1587, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 7015 at *5 (Fed. Cir.
2007). There was a circular indemnity that wiped out a patent owner’s infringement claims. See Marta
Belcher & John Casey, Hacking the Patent System: A Guide to Alternative Patent Licensing for Innovators,
(Jan.
2016),
at
25
https://www.eff.org/files/2016/01/26/hacking_the_patent_system_belcher_and_casey_updated_january_20
16.pdf (“RPX offers optional indemnification insurance to protect a company’s customers from patent troll
lawsuits for using the company’s products.”).
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chain worried about patent litigation risk might individually or jointly purchase insurance
from a third party.
Insurance is available for patent infringement defense, but this sort of insurance is
not often purchased. 57 It is not clear why this insurance has not gained greater acceptance
in the market. 58 It is interesting to observe that insurance against copyright and trade secret
lawsuits is often purchased. 59 Possibly the limited availability of patent defense insurance
is explained by greater uncertainty associated with patent litigation as compared to
copyright and trade secret litigation. 60 That uncertainty may be explained by poor notice
in patent law and the frequency of inadvertent patent infringement. 61
Poor notice in patent law implies that neither the insurer nor the insured has a good
idea of the risk of a patent lawsuit against the insured. In copyright and trade secret suits,

57

Recently, RPX has introduced a patent litigation defense insurance policy. Belcher and Casey, supra note
50, at 24 (“RPX has used its store of litigation cost data as well as confidential and anonymized cost
information from each policyholder to build an actuarial model for patent troll risk. Based on its estimation
of the frequency and cost of NPE attacks against an individual company, RPX works with companies to
deliver the appropriate amount of coverage for each company with varying annual premiums, starting at
$5,000. To determine the policy price for small companies, RPX takes into account, among other things, the
company’s previous experiences with NPEs and the company’s visibility. RPX says that it prices and issues
insurance policies within 10 days.”); see also Joshua M. Dalton & Sarah K. Paige, Finding the Right Way to
(Sept.
8,
2016),
Deal
with
Patent
Demand
Letters,
LAW360,
http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/836518/finding-the-right-way-to-deal-with-patent-demand-letters
(expressing skepticism about insurance and use of defensive aggregators because of the “often prohibitive
cost”); Maureen Veterano, Intellectual Property Insurance: What Attorneys Need to Know, IPWATCHDOG,
(Mar. 27, 2011), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/03/27/intellectual-property-insurance-what-attorneysneed-to-know/id=15904/ (“[M]ost IP attorneys do not know that IP insurance is available to help fund their
client’s IP litigation risks.”); J. Rodrigo Fuentes, Patent Insurance: Towards a More Affordable, Mandatory
Scheme? 10 COL. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 267, 284-88 (2009).
58
See Amy O' Connor, CEOs, Insurers Finally Ready to Embrace Intellectual Property Insurance?
JOURNAL,
(Sept.
9,
2013),
INSURANCE
http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/features/2013/09/09/303859.htm.
59
See Crabb, supra note 9, at 394 (discussing copyright defense insurance in the context of movie
distribution). Recently, insurers have also introduced “tech E&O” liability insurance which covers software
and tech companies against claims of negligence relating to “data hosting, data processing, computer systems
analysis, network management services and software programming.” Darren Teshima, 5 Insurance Issues to
Consider in Tech Transactions, LAW360, (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/832623/5insurance-issues-to-consider-in-tech-transactions.
60
See Fuentes, supra note 57, at 288-89; Dratler, supra note 8, at 9-10.
61
Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 41
(2013).
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a defendant may benefit from an independent creation defense: if the defendant knows and
can prove that it created the disputed intellectual property, then it will prevail. 62 Such a
defense is simply not available in patent law, and helps explain why most losing defendants
in patent lawsuits were unaware that their actions were infringing. 63 In the copyright and
trade secret settings, it is easier for an insurer and an insured can more easily to monitor
for and avoid infringement, which makes the price of the insurance policy appealing, and
explains the commercial success of insurance for copyright and trade secret violations.
Another impediment to broader reliance on patent insurance might be the
perception that patent litigation risks are correlated. Insurers manage risk by writing
policies for a large number of insureds that face uncorrelated risk. For example, a property
insurer has good reason to believe that the risk of damage from a lightning strike is virtually
uncorrelated for homes in different neighborhoods, certainly in different cities. If the
insurer covers many homes across the country, it can be confident that its total costs of
coverage will fall into a narrow range, and aggregation of these independent hazards
virtually eliminates the risk faced by the insurer.
The hazard of defending a patent litigation suit might be correlated across firms for
at least two reasons. The rise of PAEs has increased the average number of defendants per
patent lawsuit. In the past, most patent lawsuits were filed against a single defendant.
Today, many suits have multiple or even dozens of defendants. Further, patent assertion
campaigns, which sometimes involve multiple suits, or sometimes no suits at all, can target

62

See Dratler, supra note 8, § 10.02(1)(c).
Bessen and Meurer, supra note 11; see also Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent
Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1442-43 (2009).

63
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hundreds of defendants. Thus, patent suits may cluster by industry or technology, creating
correlated risk for an insurer.
The second source of correlated risk comes from changes in patent law that either
affect the probabilities of patent assertion and litigation success by the patent owner, or the
expected damages given patent owner success. When patent law changes in a way that is
generous to one side or the other, that means that expected claims from the insured
defendants rise or fall together. Some commentators have suggested that patent law has
changed often in recent years, making the field more uncertain than other areas of the law. 64
These changes contribute to correlated risks, causing a sluggish market for patent litigation
defense insurance.
Because patent defense insurance seems to be unappealing to most businesses, 65
supply chain managers are left with indemnification clauses to allocate the risk of patent
defense within the supply chain. Much like insurance policies, indemnification clauses can
be complicated: the clauses may be limited by floors and caps, or to certain technologies
and uses. The parties typically decide whether indemnity is triggered by a final judgment,
the filing of a lawsuit, or merely the assertion of a patent. They may also negotiate the
control of settlement and litigation. Finally, the parties may take care to coordinate the roles
of multiple potential indemnitors.

64

See generally F. Scott Kieff & Henry E. Smith, How Not to Invent a Patent Crisis, REACTING TO THE
SPREE:
POLICY
CHANGES
WE
CAN
AFFORD
55-72
(2009)
SPENDING
http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1756&context=faculty_publications (discussing
recent changes in patent law and their resulting tensions).
65
Joshua M. Dalton & Sarah K. Paige, Finding the Right Way to Deal with Patent Demand Letters, LAW360,
(Sept. 8, 2016) http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/836518/finding-the-right-way-to-deal-with-patentdemand-letters (“[Services from aggregators and insurers] are no panacea. Coverage is not uniform, and the
costs often run into the $100,000s per year. ‘Ultimately it’s an economic decision,’ says Enrique Colbert,
general counsel at online retailer Wayfair Inc. ‘But high retention that fails to help with nuisance claims,
relatively low limits that may not protect against major threats, and expensive premiums all cut against buying
insurance.’”).
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Rather than allocating all of the risk to one party or the other, intermediate
allocations are also possible. Some indemnitors choose to avoid dealing with frivolous
patent assertions by including a floor that must be reached (like a deductible) before any
indemnification is paid. 66 Some indemnitors include caps on their total payments; the
policy limit is the analogous provision in an insurance policy. 67 These caps can motivate
the indemnitee to work with the indemnitor to fight the patent suit.
Indemnitors may avoid dealing with frivolous lawsuits 68 by limiting
indemnification to cases in which the indemnitee reaches a final judgment. 69 Only a small
percent of patent lawsuits reach final judgment, and thus this limitation is quite severe. A
common intermediate term limits indemnification to cases in which a lawsuit is filed. The
most generous language for the indemnitee includes cases in which a patent has been
asserted but before the filing of a lawsuit.
A moment’s reflection reveals why indemnification clauses typically assign control
of the patent litigation to the indemnitor. When the indemnitee has control of settlement
and litigation, the indemnitor must worry that the indemnitee will not work hard to defeat

66

See Michael L. Bloom, Emily R. Goebel, Kelly M. Hagen and Michael J. Schmale, Indemnification: When
Silence Might Not Be a Virtue; The Transactional Lab, CORP. COUNSEL (Dec. 12, 2013) (noting use of caps
and floors to limit liability in indemnification provisions).
67
See Michael Bloom, Lindsey Chandler and Alexa Peterson, Some IP Indemnification Considerations for
Tech Vendors, CORP. COUNSEL (June 13, 2016) (noting caps may be used to limit IP indemnification
liability); see also Moore & Assocs., Inc. v. Jones & Carter, Inc., 217 F. App'x 430 (6th Cir. 2007)
(interpreting a contract for engineering service and applying a cap from a provision limiting liability to an
indemnity clause).
68
Warranty and indemnity obligations do not extend to frivolous claims. See, e.g., Pac. Sunwear of Cal., Inc.
v. Olaes Enters., Inc., 167 Cal. App. 4th 466, 474 (2008) (“[Indemnification under California’s version of
U.C.C. § 2-312(3)] broadly encompass[es] any nonfrivolous claim of infringement that significantly
interferes with the buyer's use of a purchased good.”); see also EZ Tag Corp. v. Casio Am., Inc., 861 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[A] claim of infringement must have some merit beyond being
“nonfrivolous” for Rule 11 purposes to support a breach of warranty claim.”).
69
See Chad A. Rutkowski, Patent Infringement Indemnification: Vendor Indemnification of Patent
Infringement Claims: Maximizing the Indemnitee’s Right to Enforcement, BLOOMBERG CORP. L.J. 282, 286
(2008).
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the claim andwill settle too quickly and generously. 70 Thus, an indemnification agreement
often requires the indemnitee provide notice of a patent dispute to the indemnitor, and allow
the indemnitor to assume responsibility for the patent defense. 71
Courts disagree about what to do if the indemnitee fails to honor these provisions.
On the one hand, courts do not want to burden indemnitors with excessive settlement
payments or damages, but on the other hand, as a public policy matter they favor early
settlement of patent disputes. 72 The same issues of notice and litigation control that occur
in patent infringement cases also arise in implied warranty of non-infringement cases. In
these situations, the courts balance the interests of the parties. 73 If supply chain managers
crave greater certainty regarding the allocation of patent defense costs, then they would be
wise to specify these terms explicitly in their indemnification agreements.
Device and software suppliers sometimes limit indemnity to cases in which the
buyer cannot combine the seller’s product with technology from another vendor without
approval from the seller. 74 This limitation could be quite restrictive for many complex
technologies. The seller’s goal is to avoid surprises that arise when a combination created
by the buyer creates an infringement risk the seller did not anticipate.
Often, complex integration of inputs from many different suppliers is unavoidable.
In these cases, the parties may worry about overlapping indemnification provisions from

70

See Rutkowski, supra note 69 (“Courts are split on whether an indemnitee has a per se right to control or
otherwise participate in the defense of an indemnitee.”).
71
See id. at 282.
72
See Rutkowski, supra note 69, at 287.
73
See Cover v. Hydramatic Packing Co., 83 F.3d 1390, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (rejecting one party’s definition
of a “rightful claim” under the UCC as not “lead[ing] to judicious public policy”); see also Phoenix Sols.,
Inc. v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d 683, 697 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that the UCC does not protect
“creations that would otherwise remain unprotected under federal law”).
74
Virginia DeMarchi, Contractual Indemnity Obligations for Patent Infringement Claims, 21 AIPLA INTELL.
PROP. LITIG. 1, 17 (2010).
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different sellers. 75 They may establish a procedure to govern control of settlement and
management of litigation by multiple indemnitors, or they might decide to give control of
the litigation to the indemnitee in each case. 76

II. RISK MANAGEMENT AND INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENTS
A. Efficient Management of the Risk of Posed by Patent Assertions
If frictions in the marketplace are not too great then contracting parties should
choose contract terms that maximize their joint profit. Economists have developed a
thorough understanding of how contracting parties should choose warranty terms to
maximize their joint profits. We can learn much about the efficiency of terms in
indemnification clauses by drawing lessons from the economics of warranties. Efficient
warranty terms may provide contracting parties with benefits in the form of insurance,
credible signaling of private information, and incentives to avoid bad outcomes. 77
Indemnification terms may provide similar benefits.
If the seller is less averse to risk than the buyer, then value is created when the seller
insures the buyer against the harm that results when a product fails, either by giving the
buyer cash or by replacing the product. This is the “insurance function” of a warranty.

75
76

See DeMarchi, supra note 68.
See Rutkowski, supra note 69, at 289. Rutkowski warns that:

This opaque analysis is further muddied when an indemnitee is potentially owed indemnity from
more than one vendor. In that case, the indemnitee’s desire to maintain control of its own defense
can be all the greater, especially if there is a concern that any one indemnitor would “steer” the
litigation in a fashion so as to maximize the liability of a co-indemnitor and thereby minimize its
own. It appears that the obligation of co-indemnitors in such situations is joint and several, such that
the indemnitee could require any one indemnitor to fully indemnify it. The indemnitee should
therefore have significant latitude in crafting an allocation scheme, for any co-indemnitor that
refuses to accept allocation is at risk for full indemnification.
77
See Winand Emons, The Theory of Warranty Contracts, 3 J. OF ECON. SURV. 44 (1989).
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Indemnification may provide a similar insurance function. If neither the buyer nor seller
has better knowledge that they are infringing a patent, or better ability to avoid
infringement, then a risk-tolerant seller can insure the buyer by defending the buyer against
patent lawsuits and paying the buyer’s resulting damages. If the buyer is less risk averse,
then making the buyer indemnify the seller maximizes the value of the contract.
A warranty provides a “signaling function” when the seller has better information
than the buyer about the reliability of a product. A rational buyer can draw an inference
about product quality by observing whether a seller offers a warranty and how generous
the warranty terms are. The inference that stronger warranties are associated with higher
quality is justified if the cost of providing a warranty increases as the quality of the product
declines.
Likewise, an indemnification clause may signal a counterparty that the indemnitor
has confidence that the parties’ joint technology development will not infringe any patents.
This signal is useful when it is hard to observe or credibly convey this information.
Analogous to the case of warranties, the signal works if the expected cost of
indemnification is higher for indemnitors with a high probability of being involved in
infringement.
A warranty plays a valuable incentive role when it encourages the parties to takes
steps to make sure that a product does not fail. For example, the seller of a refrigerator may
offer a generous warranty on the compressor, but only a limited warranty on the door. The
compressor warranty gives an incentive to the seller to monitor the manufacturing process
to make sure the compressor is reliable. The limited warranty on the door gives the buyers
an incentive to ensure their children don’t swing on the refrigerator door. Likewise, the
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scope of an indemnification clause may be tailored to include product features and uses
controlled by the indemnitor, and exclude features and uses that are mainly controlled by
the indemnitee. 78
These simple lessons from the economics of warranties provide useful guidance for
selecting contract terms in patent litigation indemnification clauses. But this guidance is
incomplete in two settings. First, in markets with significant contracting frictions, even
rational parties might not select terms that maximize joint profit. Second, in settings in
which patent infringement risk is difficult to manage, efficient indemnification terms may
be determined largely by concerns about how the parties can strengthen their joint
bargaining position vis à vis a patent owners who assert patents after alleged infringement.
B. Contracting Frictions and Joint Profit Maximization
Rational parties may be discouraged from structuring indemnification agreements
to maximize their joint profit because of contracting frictions. 79 These frictions take many
forms. In the simplest case, the costs of negotiating and drafting the contract terms
outweigh the gains from managing the risk associated with an unlikely or low-stakes patent
lawsuit. For example, nineteen utility patents have issued in the United States since the
year 2000 on tambourines and related percussion instruments. 80 It seems unlikely that firms

78

"The economic explanation for the complete shifting of liability from one joint tortfeasor to another that is
brought about by indemnity is straightforward. In an alternative-care case we do not want both tortfeasors to
take precautions; we want the lower-cost accident avoider to do so. The liability of the other is a backstop in
case insolvency prevents the threat of tort liability from deterring the primary accident avoider. Hence the
need for a mechanism that will, where possible, shift the ultimate liability to the most efficient accident
avoider; indemnity does this." RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 190 (6th ed. 2003).
79
See Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz, & Richard Craswell, The Law and Economics of Contracts,
eds. A. Mitch Polinsky & Steve Shavell, 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 11-12 (2007).
80
Based on an inspection of the USPTO patent classification of tambourines, 84/814. See USPTO FULLAND
IMAGE
DATABASE,
http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nphTEXT
Parser?Sect1=PTO2&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2Fsearchbool.html&r=0&f=S&l=50&TERM1=84%2F418&FIELD1=ORCL&d=pall.
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operating in this field face an expected cost of patent litigation large enough to justify
incurring the costs of negotiating and drafting terms addressing patent litigation defense.
Limited wealth creates a more significant friction. Software vendors may lack the
financial assets required to make a credible indemnification promise to a large buyer.
Absent the wealth constraint the parties might have found it optimal for the software vendor
to manage the risk of patent infringement; the vendor might have better knowledge of the
relevant patent rights, and likely has better knowledge of the technology and whether its
employees copied patented software. Wealth constraints may be a significant friction
because patent litigation insurance may be unaffordable, and often the damages in a patent
suit far exceed the profit that the vendor expected to derive from the sale of its software.
Generally, limited wealth may disrupt efficient indemnification in any industry, and
potentially discourages entry of start-ups into fields in which vendors are expected to cover
the costs of patent litigation.
Lack of competition may create another type of friction. One of the parties may
have sufficient bargaining power to impose its favored indemnification clause on its
counterparty rather than maximize joint profit. A sloppy but intuitive analysis holds that a
large seller with market power would simply refuse to indemnify a small buyer to avoid
the expected cost. Likewise, some would argue that a large buyer would insist on
indemnification regardless of what is efficient. But this intuition often fails. If the dominant
party has good information about its counterparty and bargaining works well, then even
dominant parties should strive to choose efficient contract terms – choices that maximize
joint profit allow the dominant party to extract more profit through the sales price. In other
words, a dominant seller will often prefer to craft an efficient indemnification agreement,
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and if that agreement imposes the expected cost of patent defense on the seller, then seller
recovers that cost (and more) through a higher sales price. 81
Up to this point I have considered the selection of an indemnification clause that
maximizes joint profit between two members of a supply chain. But I have so far ignored
the possibility of a broader agreement that includes the patent owner as well as members
of the supply chain. Patent litigation would not arise and indemnification agreements would
not be necessary if supply chain members simply obtained a license from the patent owner
before commercializing a new technology.
The fundamental market friction that makes indemnification clauses important
derives from the difficulty faced by parties commercializing a new technology to learn
about the patent rights that might be asserted against them. 82 Absent early notice of patent
rights, supply chain members cannot bargain over patent rights in advance of their design,
marketing, and distribution activities. When notice works well, indemnification clauses are
unimportant. In most industries, parties working to commercialize a new technology
normally expect that patents could be asserted against them despite their efforts to clear the
rights in advance. Of course, the parties should try to clear patent rights in advance when
they can, and the indemnification clause can be used to motivate the party in the best
position to clear the rights in advance to do so.

81

Market power leads to an inefficient contract term only when the dominant firms’ share of the joint profit
rises enough to offset shrinkage in total profit associated with the inefficiency. See generally, John Vickers,
Market power and inefficiency: a contracts perspective, 12 OXFORD REV. ECON. POLICY, 11 (1996).
82
See Dratler, supra note 8, at 4.
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III. LITIGATION BARGAINING POWER AND INDEMNIFICATION
AGREEMENTS
A. Bargaining Power and Control of Litigation
In addition to risk management, firms in a supply chain may benefit from
considering the impact of indemnification agreements on litigation and settlement
outcomes that may follow the assertion of a patent against a member of the supply chain. 83
It might be the case that a particular member of the supply chain would be a more effective
bargainer than others and thus should control litigation and settlement negotiations.
Generally, an effective bargainer is experienced, motivated, well-informed, patient,
and tolerant of risk. The firm in the supply chain that best exhibits these characteristics
may be the right firm to shoulder the burden of indemnification and control of patent
litigation. This depends, of course, on whether risk management concerns are important,
and whether the most effective bargainer is different from the most effective risk manager.
On the flip side, when supply chain members have not coordinated patent litigation
defense in advance, it makes sense for patent owners to target the weakest bargainers in
the supply chain with a patent assertion. Commentators have observed this tactic is often
used by PAEs when they assert patents against the customers of computer and
communications firms. 84 For example, the purchaser of a router who uses it in a retail

83

Economic theory suggests that liability insurance can be used to strengthen the bargaining power of
defendants. See Michael Meurer, The Gains from Faith in an Unfaithful Agent: Settlement Conflicts
between Defendants and Liability Insurers, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 502 (1992); Jorge Lemus, Emil
Temnyalov & John L. Turner, Liability Insurance: Equilibrium Contracts under Monopoly and
Competition, (2017), available at: https://www.rse.anu.edu.au/media/1928500/Emil-Temnyalov-Paper.pdf.
84
See generally, Love & Yoon, supra note 30; Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation,
55 B.C. L. REV. 1443 (2014); Gaia Bernstein, The End User’s Predicament: Standing to Sue in Patent
Litigation, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1929 (2016); Complaint, Cisco, Inc. v. Innovative Wireless Sols., LLC, Civil
Action
No.
1:13-cv-00492,
available
at
http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/64/2013/06/Cisco-Systems-Inc-v-Innovative-Wireless-Solutions-LLC-Complaint.pdf
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establishment is unlikely to know much about the industry, the technology, or the patent,
or have experience with patent litigation. 85 The manufacturer can mount a stronger defense
and bargain more effectively than the customer if it has better knowledge of the prior art
that might be used to invalidate asserted patent claims, or better knowledge of the ease or
difficulty in redesigning a product to avoid infringement of the claims as construed in
court. 86
From an ex ante perspective, the ideal defendant internalizes (i.e., pays attention to
and acts on) the interests of all supply chain members with regard to the outcome of the
patent litigation. Numerous customers, retailers, or distributors in some supply chains
might not have much at stake in a patent litigation and therefore might not find it rational
to mount a defense when a patent is asserted against them. Firms at the center of a supply
chain will tend to have higher stakes and a more inclusive perspective. 87
A centrally located member of a supply chain, often the manufacturer, typically has
the strongest incentives to litigate. 88 If the manufacturer sells the same or similar products

(“On information and belief, IWS is pursuing a litigation strategy of suing retail purchasers, as opposed to
the actual manufacturers of the standard compliant Wi-Fi products (e.g., Cisco), in order to leverage the cost
of litigation against targets that do not have the resources, inclination or technical knowledge about the
products or standards necessary to defend against IWS’s allegations.”).
85
See Dratler, supra note 8, at 6; Love & Yoon, supra note 30, at 1614 (2013) (“[M]anufacturers . . . generally
have greater knowledge of the industry, the prior art, and the patented invention’s value [than customers].”);
Rutkowski, supra note 69, at 282 (“[V]endor typically has the knowledge and expertise to discern what
patents are implicated by the manufacture and sale of its product.”).
86
See Dratler, supra note 8, at 35; Chad Ennis & Chris Shield, It Might Be a Bad Idea for NPEs to Attack
Cloud Services, Law360 (Sept. 1, 2017), available at: https://www.law360.com/articles/958668/it-might-bea-bad-idea-for-npes-to-attack-cloud-services (“Cloud service providers … have been proactively developing
new strategies to discourage NPE attacks. This includes modifying their user agreements to align their
interests with their customers’ interests, and providing their customers with additional tools to discourage
infringement suits. Of course, the user agreements are public documents so the provisions are widely
available for NPEs to see and consider. Through these agreements, the cloud service providers have signaled
that the NPEs will face tough and organized opponents if the NPEs use their standard tactics.”)
87
See Love & Yoon, supra note 30, at 1625 (manufacturers may be willing to litigate with NPEs in order to
develop a reputation as a tough negotiator).
88
See Love & Yoon, supra note 30, at 1621-22 (manufacturers will act in the collective interest of their
customers if the manufacturers control patent infringement defense).
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to multiple buyers, then the number of distinct transactions potentially multiplies the
collective gain from effective litigation. The manufacturer is more likely to benefit from
litigation savings across all these transactions than any one buyer could benefit. 89 In fact,
when buyers control litigation they may sometimes be tempted to cooperate with the patent
owner to the detriment of other buyers. For instance, it is easy to see that a buyer might be
more willing than the seller to drop a strong invalidation argument in the context of a
settlement, despite the benefit that other buyers might derive if the patent is invalidated. 90
Sophisticated PAEs are likely to look beyond simple customer status when they
target potential defendants for a patent assertion. For example, they are likely to avoid
suing firms that have developed a reputation for fighting PAE assertions. More
surprisingly, Cohen, Gurun, and Kominer find that PAEs target firms with high cash
balances and firms that are distracted by other litigation. 91
How can knowledge of these targeting strategies be used to craft supply chain
agreements about litigation control? Roughly speaking, tough defendants want to be known
and weak defendants want to hide. To elaborate, if firm X has agreed to indemnify its
customers and take control of patent litigation defense, and X has a reputation for fighting

There is an interesting parallel between indemnifications agreements and subrogation agreements
in insurance contracts. Subrogation agreements may strengthen the incentive of plaintiffs to litigate. See A.
Mitchell Polinksy & Steven Shavell, Subrogation and the Theory of Insurance When Suits Can Be Brought
for Losses Suffered, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper Series 4 (2017), available
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2942448.
89
See Rutkowski, supra note 69, at 282 (“Because the vendor wants to sell to as many buyers as possible, it
has the incentive to either ensure non-infringement or purchase appropriate licenses.”) (“[V]endor typically
has the knowledge and expertise to discern what patents are implicated by the manufacture and sale of its
product. Because the vendor wants to sell to as many buyers as possible, it has the incentive to either ensure
non-infringement or purchase appropriate licenses.”).
90
See Love & Yoon, supra note 30, at 1635 (arguing that customer defendants may be lured with a generous
settlement offer to work with a patent owner and against the interest of future customer defendants).
91
Cohen, Lauren and Gurun, Umit G. and Kominers, Scott Duke, Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted
Firms (August 21, 2016). Harvard Business School Finance Working Paper No. 15-002. Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2464303 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2464303.
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patent assertions, is not cash flush, and is not currently occupied with other litigation, then
X wants potential patent asserters to know its identity and the terms of the indemnification
agreement. On the other hand, if firm Y is a manufacturer with characteristics that make it
an attractive target, then it might be efficient for customers to be responsible for their own
defense, and publicize that firm Y does not indemnify its customers. Or perhaps instead Y
does indemnify its customers but tries to hide its identity and its contractual connections to
its customers.
Thus far, I have focused on control over litigation. I need to complete my analysis
with some comments about the allocation of the cost of litigation and settlement license
fees. Control over settlement and litigation, and responsibility for indemnification and are
naturally coupled—the party that pays indemnification wants to control the cost of
indemnification. And this works the other way, if a party gives up control over litigation,
then it does not want to be on the hook for the cost of litigation.
This coupling of control and financial responsibility generally makes sense. When
the two features of the indemnification agreement are separated that creates the potential
for conflict. However, in the next section I will analyze reasons why supply chain members
might rationally choose less than perfect alignment between control and financial
responsibility in a quest for greater bargaining power against a patent asserter.

B. Conflict as a Source of Bargaining Power

If a single party controls litigation for the supply chain and that party is not fully
liable for the outcome of litigation, then conflict is possible among supply chain members
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over the decision to settle with the patent-plaintiff. For example, suppose an
indemnification agreement caps liability at $20 million, and a plaintiff offers to settle a suit
filed against an indemnitee for $20 million. An indemnitee would agree to such an offer
and avoid any chance of liability, but the indemnitor might reject the settlement offer if
litigation promised lower expected cost – thus, the conflict. 92

The parties can avoid

this sort of conflict by specifying in their contract that the indemnitor must act in the joint
interest of the parties, or that the indemnitee can accept any offer, or that the parties jointly
decide on settlement decisions. 93 Interestingly, avoidance of conflict may not be efficient.
Indemnification caps which create possible conflicts may increase the bargaining power of
the indemnitor versus the patent-plaintiff, and thus maximize the expected joint profit of
supply chain members. Put differently, an indemnitee may be willing to risk an ex post
conflict regarding settlement in order to encourage the indemnitor to bargain aggressively.
Here is an example that demonstrates the logic behind such a strategy. Suppose that
patent damages are uncertain—they may take a low value of $3 million with a probability
of 2/3, or they may take a high value of $9 million dollars with a probability of 1/3. Suppose
that trial cost is $1 million for both the plaintiff and the defendant. A risk neutral patent
owner would demand a minimum of $4 million in a settlement. 94 A risk neutral indemnitor
would pay as much as $6 million to settle—assuming the indemnitor is fully responsible
for settlement and litigation costs. 95 The parties could settle for any value between $4

92

Notice that there is not necessarily a conflict. If the cost of litigation is high and the chances of winning
the lawsuit are small, then the indemnitor might also be willing to agree to the settlement offer.
93
Despite the obvious contractual solutions to this problem, in the liability insurance context, for many years,
these sorts of conflicts were a standard feature of liability insurance contracts. This industry practice ended
when state courts imposed a duty of good faith on liability insurers that required them to consider the interest
of the insured as well as the insurance company’s interest when making settlement and litigation choices in
tort litigation.
94
Patent owner minimum = (2/3)3 + (1/3)9 - 1 = 4.
95
Indemnitor maximum = (2/3)3 + (1/3)9 + 1 = 6.
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million and $6 million inclusive. For simplicity, I will assume the parties have equal
bargaining skill and settle at the midpoint of $5 million.
Now suppose that the indemnitor capped its liability at a value C that is a value
greater than $3 million and less than $9 million. The patent owner’s minimum demand
remains $4 million. The indemnitor is now willing to pay at most (2/3)(3) + (1/3)C + 1 =
3 + C/3. (Notice that when C = 9, this value is 6, as above.) If the parties have equal
bargaining skill then they will agree to a settlement at the midpoint of these values which
is 7/2 + C/6. The settlement value rises with C. It equals 4 when C = 3, and 5 when C = 9,
and a value between 4 and 5 when C is between 3 and 9. Intuitively, the indemnitor is more
aggressive in the settlement negotiation because it is not fully liable if trial occurs and a
high level of damages are awarded—the lower the cap, the more aggressive is the
indemnitor. But there must be catch—right? The catch is that the indemnitee would suffer
expected trial costs from this strategy if the cap is pushed too low. If C is pushed below $3
million, then the maximum that indemnitor is willing to pay is less than the minimum that
the patent owner is willing to accept, and the parties go to trial.
This example reveals the bargaining advantage that the supply chain members can
gain from liability caps in indemnification agreements. The example also reveals that caps
may create a conflict between the goals of the indemnitor and indemnitee, and that conflict
may cause settlement failure. Notice that the bargaining advantage disappears if the
indemnitee can intervene in the settlement negotiations and insist on acceptance of an offer
within the cap. Thus, the bargaining advantage of the cap depends on the credibility of an
indemnitor’s commitment not to renegotiate the indemnification agreement with the

5 March 2018

PATENT LITIGATION INDEMNIFICATION

32

indemnitee after a patent is asserted against the indemnitee. 96 Finally, notice that in practice
supply chain members are likely to face a more complex litigation environment such that
caps create both a degree of bargaining power and an increased risk of inefficient litigation.
The choice of an optimal cap would be difficult, and it is possible that no cap at all would
be optimal. 97

CONCLUSION

Parties in a supply chain and other parties who cooperate to bring new technology
to the market face a risk that a patent will be asserted against one or more of them. If the
risk is sufficiently high then it is efficient for the parties to contract in advance regarding
how they will share the costs of patent litigation and settlement licensing, and who will
control the settlement and litigation. This Article provides guidance regarding the choice
of efficient terms in indemnification agreements that respond to two objectives: efficient
risk management and effective bargaining against a patent-plaintiff. Likely, the first
objective is more important for chemicals and other technologies for which patent notice
works well and patent clearance is manageable. And likely, the second objective is more

96

See Meurer, supra note 83; Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith Refusal to Settle by Liability Insurers: Some
Implications of the Judgment-Proof Problem, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 77 (1994).
97
Patent defense insurance that contains policy limits may generate the same strategic benefit as
indemnification clauses with caps. The new RPX policies do have caps, but I do not know how they are
determined. See Marta Belcher and John Casey, Hacking the Patent System: A Guide to Alternative Patent
Licensing
for
Innovators
24
(Jan.
2016),
available
at
https://www.eff.org/files/2016/01/26/hacking_the_patent_system_belcher_and_casey_updated_january_20
16.pdf (“RPX has developed a variety of specialized policies to account for individual companies’ risk
profiles. Annual premiums start at $5,000, retentions (similar to deductibles) are between $25,000 and
$500,000, and copays start at 10%. The policy provides limits of between $1 million and $10 million
annually.”).
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important for software and most other technologies for which patent notice works poorly
and patent clearance is difficult. 98
This Article does not engage policy questions concerning the social impact of
indemnification agreements, but it is easy to identify points of intersection between the
descriptive analysis in this Article and patent policy discussion. Let me briefly note a few
significant issues. First, indemnification agreements are more effective when an
indemnitee recognizes that they have a right to indemnification. This is not always
straightforward because many patent assertions are threadbare. If a complaint filed by a
patent owner does not identify the claims being asserted or the accused technology in
sufficient detail, then the targeted party may not know which (if any) of multiple vendors
might be responsible for indemnification. Procedural reforms that require more detailed
pleadings in patent cases may effectively respond to this concern. 99 Second, shifting
control of patent litigation to a manufacturer or other party at the center of a supply chain,
potentially creates efficiency in resolving litigation. This goal is served by thoughtful
indemnification agreements, but it could be further advanced if courts routinely stayed
patent suits against customers, and provided a generous test of standing in declaratory

98
For evidence that firms in the software, computer, and communications supply chain are often highly
innovative, but “patent-poor” see Mercedes Delgado & Karen G. Mills, A New Categorization of the U.S.
Economy: The Role of Supply Chain Industries in Performance, 02/06/2017 at 5, available at:
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/Paper_SupplyChain_MD_KM_05-23-2016_ac3f26a06022-4bf0-a719-39a6b4b4450e.pdf (“We also note that there is a big difference between the STEM content
(i.e., technology intensity) and patenting of the different types of traded suppliers. While STEM
occupations are most prevalent in suppliers of traded services (55% of all STEM jobs), this subcategory
only accounts for around 2% of all the utility patents granted in 2013. The large STEM-patenting gap
suggests that the contribution to innovation of these suppliers of services may be much higher than
predicted based on their low patenting.”). Id. at 21 (“Another important finding is the big gap between the
STEM content (innovation input) and the patenting (innovation output) of the different segments of the
supply chain economy. STEM occupations are most prevalent in suppliers of traded services (with 55% of
all STEM jobs and 19% STEM intensity), but this subcategory only accounts for around 2% of all the
patents.”).
99
DeMarchi, supra note 674, at 17.
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judgments suits for indemnitors. 100 Third, patent courts sometimes assess the significance
of indemnification agreements as they relate to patent law doctrine. The nature of an
indemnification agreement may be relevant to the question of whether an indemnitor
induced patent infringement, 101 and also to the question of whether a firm is a real-partyin-interest for purposes of instituting an inter partes challenge of patent claims before the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board. 102 A good understanding of the nature of the business
purposes of indemnification terms should improve courts’ analyses of these issues.

100

See Dratler, supra note 8, at 27; Love & Yoon, supra note 30, at 1614 (“Under the customer suit exception,
courts can stay litigation filed against a customer until after the resolution of a later-filed declaratory
judgment action initiated by the accused product’s manufacturer.”) and at 1617-19 (In recent years courts
have restricted the availability of the customer suit exception.); Kahn v. General Motors Corp., 889 F.2d
1078 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (applying the first to file rule instead of the customer suit exception when Motorola
filed a declaratory judgment suit after the patent owner sued General Motors over a car radio, the Fed. Cir.
said that the Motorola component did not infringe, infringement occurred only when GM combined Motorola
component with other components).
101
See Dratler, supra note 8, at 2 (inducement liability based on indemnification agreements); H.B. Fuller
Co. v. National Starch & Chem. Corp., 689 F. Supp. 923, 945 (D. Minn. 1988); Sing v. Culture Prods., Inc.,
469 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (E.D. Mo. 1979);Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1470
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (The “Federal Circuit noted that cases had held that an intent to induce infringement could
be inferred from an indemnification clause when the primary purpose was to overcome the deterrent effect
of the patent laws. It concluded, however, that the purpose of the indemnification clause in the case before it
was to obtain the highest sales price for the division, rather than to induce infringement after the sale.”).
102
35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West 2010) (“An inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting
the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy
of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.”). In a lawsuit brought by the
non-practicing entity Intellectual Ventures against JP Morgan Chase, the question arose whether an
indemnitor is a “real party in interest” for purposes of this provision. See Patrick T. Muffo, When an
Indemnifying Party Can Be Considered a “Real Party in Interest,” AIPLA NEWSSTAND, (Oct. 6, 2015)
available at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=906e4ec6-bf86-45c8-aa3f-0e573ff9b36d (The
PTAB stated that an important consideration in making this determination is whether the indemnitor
“exercised or could have exercised control over a party’s participation in a proceeding.” (quoting Office
Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012))); IBM Corp. v. Intell. Ventures II,
(Motion for Additional Discovery denied) IPR2015-01322, (September 24, 2015), aff’d, Wi-Fi One, LLC v.
Broadcom Corp., Fed. Cir., 2015-1944, September 16, 2016.

